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Appellees commence their brief by stating (p.6) that they have difficulty in 
identifying the issues raised on appeal".. .because they are confusing." This is 
surprising as each point is specifically identified, with substantiating authorities. 
Such an approach sets the tone for the remainder of Appellees' brief. 
Appellees attempt to create confusion where none exists. They do not 
question or refute any statement of fact set forth by Appellant, which Appellant 
supported with specific record references. Appellees do not set forth a 
counterstatement of facts merely citing verbatim the decision of the lower court in 
lieu thereof, sans any references to the record to support them. As pointed out in 
Appellant's brief, several of the facts referred to therein were contrary to the record 
or unfounded suppositions of the lower court on which it based its conclusions. 
No matter how imaginative Appellees are in trying to muddy the waters, the 
issue herein is not the reasonableness of any fact finding. The appeal deals 
exclusively with issues of law in keeping with the original contentions of both 
parties when cross moving for summary judgment. It solely involves legal issues 
to be reviewed for correctness. 
Appellees state "the breach of good faith and fair dealings" is a factual issue. 
They ignore the authoritative treatises and multiple appellate decisions of Points 
IA, IB and IC of Appellant's brief, holding the court cannot modify unambiguous 
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contractual provisions, disregard its express conditions or insert terms that it 
believes to be fair. 
Appellees likewise distort Appellant's position in Points IIA and IIB. 
Although injunctive relief often is considered discretionary, the authorities cited by 
Appellant establish, where restrictive covenants are breached, it is the only 
appropriate and adequate remedy, so as to restore the status quo. This is 
particularly apt when the violative act was knowingly done and CC&R (10.2) 
expressly provides for it. 
Appellees are correct in stating the failure to award counsel fees is ordinarily 
considered to be within the discretion of the lower court. However, as Appellants 
addressed in Point III, had the court below applied the controlling law, the failure 
to grant reasonable attorney's fees would have exceeded allowable parameters. 
This is buttressed by the fact that Appellees erected the fence surreptitiously during 
the few days Appellant was out of town and legal fees and costs are provided for in 
CC&R (10.2 (a). By declining to grant reimbursement of Appellant's substantial 
fees, Appellant has been further penalized although he is the wronged party. 
Appellees argue, and set forth case law, unrelated to the issues before this 
court. Rather than respond to points and authorities set forth in Appellant's brief, 
Appellees use phrases like "unreasonably withheld his permission", "abuses 
discretion", "where there is doubt about interpretation of a contract" which are not 
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present on this appeal and then cite cases related to such inapplicable premises. 
Interestingly, however, in one instance they cite Nixon vs. Nixon (bottom of page 
17) holding that "...where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so 
provides..." it will be enforced even if the result appears to be harsh and 
unreasonable. Even so, Appellant does not acknowledged it is harsh and 
unreasonable to enforce a requirement of prior consent when the formidable barrier 
ran along Appellant's rear property line and closed off its only remaining 
unobstructed side. 
The lower court sustained plaintiffs position that prior consent was a 
requirement and not a just a courtesy but Appellees nevertheless continue to argue 
this without any new foundation or cross-appeal. Likewise, they again urge, 
without further facts or law, that the variance vote should be given some 
consideration, although it was specified, and the lower court confirmed, that such 
procedure relates solely to issues of "design". 
Appellees state on page 19 that a party should "not render it difficult or 
impossible for the other to continue performance and then take advantage of the 
non performance he has caused". Nothing identified by Appellees or appearing in 
the record, demonstrates what Appellant improperly did to prevent any 
performance. Appellant and Martins just chose not to consent to the fence which 
they had the right to do, had their consents been requested. 
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Appellees claim they are ignorant of any case law which grants a party the 
absolute right to enforce a clear provision of a contract, notwithstanding all the 
authorities cited in Appellant's brief in Points 1 A, B and C. 
Appellees make an argument of "justified expectations and common 
purposes" notwithstanding prior permission (7.5), and the violation being deemed 
a nuisance subject to abatement (10.1), are patently clear in the duly adopted 
Ranch Place CC&Rs. Should Appellees' position be upheld, express terms of any 
CC&Rs, as well as a variety of other contracts would mean little until each was 
passed upon, in every case, by a court. If the intent was to make the consent 
requirement subject to "reasonableness" it would have been so stated. 
Appellees' brief is a broad shotgun presentation quoting general principles 
out of context, not directed to the issues of this appeal. They have not rebutted the 
material facts or case law set forth in Appellant's brief. It is therefore respectfully 
suggested that the need for oral argument has not been demonstrated. 
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